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Abstract Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are
increasingly important drivers for businesses’ self-regula-
tion to operate in a sustainable way. We shift the perspective
on NGOs from focusing on their advocacy role to focusing
on their accountability for having sustainable internal oper-
ations. In a multiple case analysis, we explore the question
‘What are the drivers and barriers to sustainable conduct of
NGOs that are sustainability advocates?’ Drawing on
institutional theory, we obtain novel insights into the legiti-
macy-seeking motivations for sustainable conduct in the
specific context of advocacy NGOs. We found that, affected
by its mission, (1) the cultural-cognitive drive is particularly
high, with sustainable conduct as an internally ‘taken-for-
granted’ behavior, followed by (2) the normative drivers,
with the balance between perceived vulnerability of needing
to ‘walk the talk’ and the sense of immunity due to lack of
external scrutiny, and (3) there are hardly any regulative
drivers. Furthermore, these organizations face idiosyncratic
trade-offs when balancing investments in their advocacy
missions with investments in sustainable operations,
reflecting ethical dilemmas. In a broader sense, this research
elucidates the way advocates cope in situations of
institutional complexity, with conflicting institutional
demands between their mission and role-model function.
Keywords Institutional complexity  Legitimacy 
Multiple cases  Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
Sustainability
Introduction
‘Well, we can’t really imagine why you would (…) spend
about like 50 to 100 thousand on doing all the certification
work because the public assumes that you are clean and
that you are complying.’ This quote from the empirical
study presented in this paper reflects the remarkable advice
given by an audit firm to an environmental non-govern-
mental organization (NGO), stating that an environmental
certification would not be worthwhile in their situation.
Contrary to firms that are often questioned about their
sustainable conduct, this quote anecdotally demonstrates
the public’s assumption that advocacy NGOs ‘walk their
talk,’ even though supporting evidence about the NGO’s
conduct is lacking. This points to an intriguing and
somewhat delicate subject of whether and how NGOs
acting as sustainability advocates are driven to embed
sustainability in their own internal operations. This subject
is of particular interest since it is widely accepted that
NGOs are among the main drivers leading firms to self-
regulate and adopt a sustainable approach in their opera-
tions (e.g., Campbell 2007; Waddock 2008). However, the
study of drivers and barriers of sustainable conduct has
focused more on firms (e.g., Bansal 2005; Bansal and Roth
2000; Delgado-Ceballos et al. 2012) than on NGOs.
This study addresses NGOs in the context of sustain-
ability. NGOs are ‘private, not-for-profit organizations that
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aim to serve particular societal interests by focusing
advocacy and/or operational efforts on social, environ-
mental, political and economic goals’ (cf. Teegen et al.
2004) rather than profit maximization. In this paper, we
focus on a specific type of NGOs that parallels to cam-
paigning organizations (Handy 1990), which we refer to as
NGOs acting as sustainability advocates. The number of
NGOs—and their influence—has grown significantly;
therefore, NGOs have been recognized as influential key
actors in an international business context (Kourula and
Laasonen 2010; Teegen et al. 2004; Waddock 2008).
The role of NGOs as watchdogs of large multinational
corporations and their advocacy role in developing good
practices are well established in the literature (e.g.,
Domeisen and Hulm 2006; Haack et al. 2012; Kong et al.
2002; Valente 2012; Van Cranenburgh et al. 2013).
However, when we shift the focus from NGOs as sus-
tainability advocates to NGOs as responsible players them-
selves, it appears that information on NGOs’ internal policies
and practices is incomplete, or even absent in some cases
(Simaens and Koster 2013), and in the literature there is a
lack of attention dedicated to NGOs’ internal sustainable
practices [apart from initial research on NGOs’ sustainability
reporting (Simaens and Koster 2013), accountability and
communicative action (Dhanani and Connolly 2015), and
limited evidence of sustainable practices by NGOs (e.g.,
Low and Davenport 2009; Wiser et al. 2001)].
It is of interest to understand NGOs’ responsibilities like
sustainable internal conduct (cf. Kourula and Laasonen
2010), and here lies the novelty of the paper, as the role
played by these advocates in terms of sustainability differs
from that played by firms and even other types of NGOs,
because sustainability is at the core of their mission. They
face potential scrutiny regarding whether they ‘walk the
talk’ internally; that is, practicing what they tell others to
do while being advocates for a more sustainable world. As
Fassin (2009, p. 503) notes when focusing on the ethical
evaluation of actions undertaken by NGO’s toward ‘victim’
corporations, the way ‘NGOs themselves act does not
always live up to the principles they advocate.’ Hence,
advocacy NGOs face specific institutional influences and
have idiosyncrasies worth studying. Research with a focus
on the position and drive of international NGOs, and
especially the NGOs acting as sustainability advocates, can
reveal novel insights into the influences that in a broader
sense encourage other advocacy or advisory organizations
to ‘walk their talk’. We address the following research
question: What are the drivers and barriers to sustainable
conduct of NGOs that are sustainability advocates?
Sustainable conduct includes the triple-bottom-line
perspective (Elkington 1998) via the integration of people,
planet, and profit criteria into the culture, strategy, and
operations of organizations (cf. Kleindorfer et al. 2005).
For the purpose of this paper, we focus on behavior that
intends to reduce environmental and social impacts, also
referred to as ‘weak sustainability’ (Roome 2011).
Institutional theory is apt as a lens to study drivers and
barriers to sustainability in research, since it recognizes
that institutions are sets of rules and practices [like formal
regulations, social norms and obligations, and shared
understandings and common beliefs (Scott 2008)] that
shape the meaning and the perceived appropriateness of
social behavior. These regulations, social norms, and
shared beliefs strongly influence the way organizations
think and act. Using institutional theory as a lens of anal-
ysis helps us understand why organizations like NGOs act
the way they do, including its drivers and barriers to sus-
tainable conduct. Thus, in our study we build on institu-
tional theory and then identify that ‘walking the talk’ is a
specific situation of complexity and potentially conflicting
demands that specifically match the perspective of insti-
tutional complexity (Greenwood et al. 2011; Kodeih and
Greenwood 2013). Institutional complexity is rooted in
institutional theory and focuses on consequences of
incompatible prescriptions from formal regulations, social
norms and obligations, and shared understandings and
common beliefs (Scott 2008), as well as on broader pre-
scriptions beyond those institutional influences.
We explore multiple cases of leading international
advocacy NGOs that target sustainability in their mission
and advocacy work: international human rights and inter-
national environmental NGOs.
We uncover elements that are relevant in institutionally
complex situations of ‘walking the talk’ and add to research
on institutional complexity with this specific walk-the-talk
context. We find the role played in particular by cultural-
cognitive and normative factors as drivers of sustainable
conduct in the context of advocacy NGOs. Furthermore, we
find that these organizations face trade-offs when balancing
investments in their advocacy missions with investments in
sustainable operations, reflecting ethical dilemmas. In a
broader sense, the novelty of this research is that it elucidates
the way advocacy or advisory organizations cope, in situa-
tions of institutional complexity (Greenwood et al. 2011;
Kodeih and Greenwood 2013), with conflicting institutional
demands between their role-model function of ‘walking the
talk’ themselves (processes) and accomplishing their advo-
cacy mission (consequences).
Theoretical Background
NGOs and Accountability
The number—and influence—of active international NGOs
has grown substantially during the last decades, from a few
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hundred in 1951 to over 50,000 in 2011 (UIA 2011; Sec-
tion 2.9). Therefore, NGOs have been recognized in an
international business context as influential key actors
(Kourula and Laasonen 2010; Teegen et al. 2004; Waddock
2008). International NGOs act as social, cultural, legal, and
environmental advocacy and/or operational groups (Kou-
rula and Laasonen 2010). In this research, we focus on
international advocacy NGOs that primarily protect the
interests of others and lobby for them, acknowledging that
advocacy NGOs may have a hybrid role by also providing
operational services (Teegen et al. 2004). Advocacy NGOs
are among the social-purpose NGOs that aim to serve
particular societal interests, addressing causes such as
environmental issues, human rights, or other areas (Doh
and Guay 2004; Teegen et al. 2004).
Research on NGOs in the fields of business and society,
management, and international literature mainly addresses
this advocacy role, activism, and influence on businesses
(Kourula and Laasonen 2010), rather than NGOs’ internal
operations. Yet, the increased organizational size of inter-
national NGOs, together with a more competitive funding
environment, has meant greater scrutiny of their own per-
formance and accountability (Anheier and Themudo 2005).
Even though NGOs are being increasingly questioned
about accountability (Jepson 2005; O’Dwyer and Unerman
2008), there has been an emphasis on upward and external
accountability to donors (Ebrahim 2005). This focus on
financial accountability conceals the role of NGOs as
agents of sustainable conduct in their own operations.
Therefore, a more holistic accountability perspective that
involves a wider range of stakeholders (Unerman and
O’Dwyer 2006b, 2010) forms the starting point of this
study.
A reason for this limited attention given to NGOs’
holistic accountability so far may be the fact that, tradi-
tionally, the advocacy role of these NGOs has given them
relative immunity from transparency (Teegen et al. 2004).
As noted by Fassin (2009, p. 511), some pressure groups
and NGOs ‘have attained a high degree of credibility.
NGOs build their legitimacy on their reputation.’ This may
quite possibly be related to the fact that trust in NGOs is
still relatively high. As reported by the ‘special Euro-
barometer’ on attitudes of European citizens toward the
environment, scientists and environmental protection
NGOs are the most trusted sources of advice and infor-
mation on environmental issues (E.C. 2011). Moreover, the
‘Edelman Trust Barometer 2016’ (Edelman 2016) indi-
cated that NGOs are still the most trusted institutions
compared to businesses, government, and media. However,
the most recent Edelman barometer data (Edelman 2017)
also show that trust in NGOs—similarly to other institu-
tions—has decreased. Moreover, as actors within a larger
network of relationships, NGOs may have stakeholders
who also call for sustainability in their internal operations,
increasing the need to explicitly consider their own sus-
tainable conduct as part of their legitimacy (Suchman
1995) and how they ‘walk their talk’.
Institutional Theory and Institutional Complexity
Institutional Theory
In prior research, institutional influences have been widely
recognized as influential for sustainable conduct (e.g.,
Bansal 2005; Campbell 2007; Doh and Guay 2006; Glover
et al. 2014; Matten and Moon 2008), though often in a
corporate context. When studying NGOs’ sustainable
conduct—an understudied topic so far—institutional theory
is a valuable lens that may elucidate idiosyncratic institu-
tional influences due to their specific position of ‘walking
the talk’. Institutional theory posits that institutions are
comprised of three pillars (regulative, normative, and cul-
tural-cognitive) that provide stability and meaning to social
life (Scott 2008).
First, the regulative pillar stresses ‘a stable system of
rules, whether formal or informal, backed by surveillance
and sanctioning power that is accompanied by feelings of
fear/guilt or innocence/incorruptibility’ (Scott 2008). This
pillar represents legally enforced rules that influence
behavior. Campbell (2007) indicated, for instance, that
corporations are more likely to act in socially responsible
ways the more they encounter strong state regulation and
collective industrial self-regulation. An example of state
regulation influencing behavior is tax law that can stimu-
late investments (Trevino et al. 2008) or philanthropic
giving; in other words, it refers to legally sanctioned ‘rules
of the game’ (Geels 2004).
Second, the normative element of institutional theory
emphasizes ‘the stabilizing influence of social beliefs and
norms that are both internalized and imposed by others’
(Scott 2008). Normative systems include values, norms,
and roles, which work as constraints to social behavior,
while certification and accreditation are important instru-
ments that somehow attest the compliance with such values
and norms. Since the institutional environment is com-
prised of normative, legal, and regulatory elements, orga-
nizations must conform to them if they are to achieve the
legitimacy that is necessary for survival (DiMaggio and
Powell 1983). Regarding normative influences, Campbell
(2007) argued that corporations will be more likely to act in
socially responsible ways if they operate in an environment
where normative calls for such behavior are institutional-
ized in, for example, important business publications,
business school curricula, and other educational venues in
which corporate managers participate, or if they belong to
trade or employer associations, which promote socially
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responsible behavior. All of these can cause a normative
climate that is morally governed and that dictates how we
are supposed ‘to do things’ (Geels 2004).
Finally, the cultural-cognitive conception of institutions
stresses ‘the central role played by the socially mediated
construction of a common framework of meaning’ (Scott
2008). This includes taken-for-granted routines, or shared
conceptions and common beliefs that tend to lead to iso-
morphism (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Taken-for-granted
routines are based on the notion of ‘the way we do those
things’ (Scott 2008) and routines that are natural to the
organization. Because of such cultural-cognitive influ-
ences, Kostova and Zaheer (1999) indicated that organi-
zational subunits are likely to encounter greater challenges
to establish and maintain legitimacy in their host envi-
ronments in comparison with domestic firms; this is due to
stereotyping and different standards applied to foreign
firms by the host environment.
Institutional theory suggests that institutional rules act as
myths that are incorporated by organizations, who thereby
gain legitimacy, resources, stability, and enhanced survival
prospects (Meyer and Rowan 1977). Legitimacy reflects
congruence between the legitimate entity’s behavior and
the shared beliefs of some social groups. Internal legiti-
macy reflects the acceptance for an organizational strategy
by its participants (insiders), whereas external legitimacy
urges organizations to comply with expectations and norms
of stakeholders who act outside the organization (e.g.,
Drori and Honig 2013). For example, for multinational
organizations legitimacy is important for gaining resources
that are vital for growth and survival. Because of the
structural complexity of those multinational organizations,
a foreign subsidiary is situated in both an external (foreign)
and an internal environment and requires both internal
legitimacy and external legitimacy, needing resources and
support from both environments (cf. Lu and Xu 2006). The
external legitimacy of a foreign subsidiary is its acceptance
and support by host-country institutions, whereas internal
legitimacy refers to its acceptance and support by the
internal organization (parent organization and other sub-
units) (Kostova and Zaheer 1999).
Institutional Complexity and ‘Walk the Talk’
The relevance of institutional theory within the context of
sustainable operations by NGOs lies not only in the link
between the quest for legitimacy, but also in the idea that
organizations with missions that go beyond profit maxi-
mization are subject to idiosyncratic institutional forces. In
the case of advocacy NGOs that might be scrutinized if
they are not ‘walking their talk,’ those forces are likely to
pose conflicting demands. When organizations have to
cope with such conflicting institutional demands, including
those coming from the regulative, normative, and cultural-
cognitive pillars (Pache and Santos 2010), they face a sit-
uation of ‘institutional complexity’ (Greenwood et al.
2011; Kodeih and Greenwood 2013). Kostova and Roth
(2002) highlighted how applying institutional theory to the
case of multinational organizations evidences the specific
complexity that these organizations face in their attempts to
leverage practices on a worldwide basis. Here the tension
appears between the need for internal objectives and norms
for global integration, on the one hand, and adaptation to
local norms and expectations on the other.
An organization’s position within a field influences the
complexity that it will encounter (Greenwood et al. 2011).
Organizational characteristics like its structure and identity
can make it particularly sensitive to certain prescriptions
(like external norms and expectations), and less so to
others. For instance, some highly visible organizations may
be especially scrutinized by stakeholders advancing par-
ticular prescriptions. Paradoxically, the same organiza-
tions, because of their size and resources, may be insulated
from institutional pressures in a way that is unavailable to
other organizations (Greenwood et al. 2011), resulting in a
kind of immunity.
For advocacy NGOs, their primary mission related to
certain sustainability issues (such as environment, human
rights) in particular may influence the focus of those
organizations’ approach toward sustainability (Simaens
and Koster 2013). NGOs’ advocacy work may raise
internal and external expectations about their own internal
behavior and make those organizations vulnerable in case
this behavior is not aligned with what they tell others to do
(such as potential accusations of hypocrisy). NGOs can be
expected—by themselves or by external parties—to con-
form to the rules they set for others. Parties that aim to
obstruct NGOs’ work (Unerman and O’Dwyer 2006a) get
chances to pinpoint inconsistencies if NGOs do not ‘walk
the talk’ and harm their legitimacy. However, NGOs also
face upward accountability to devote their scarce time and
resources to their primary advocacy work, more than to the
internal organization. Thus, this ‘walk-the-talk’ context in
which advocacy NGOs operate brings a specific situation
of complexity and potentially conflicting demands,
matching the notion of institutional complexity.
The way organizations cope with such complexity is
addressed in very few empirical studies, and further
examination of how organizations respond to conflicting
demands is needed (Kodeih and Greenwood 2013) since
responses to institutional complexity may affect legitimacy
and even organizational survival (Greenwood et al. 2011).
Trade-offs, negotiations, distinctive capabilities and the
careful balancing of resources, stakeholder interest, and
strategic sourcing have been raised in research as require-
ments to cope with institutional complexity (Vermeulen
M. Koster et al.
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et al. 2016). Hence, these coping mechanisms—such as
trade-offs—result from the institutionally complex situa-
tions which organizations face and in which incompatible
influences need to be embedded. This study addresses this
area that is recommended for further research (Kodeih and
Greenwood 2013) in the complex context of sustainability
advocates and their internal conduct. However, in a broader
sense, institutional complexity around ‘walking the talk’
may also affect other advocacy or advisory organizations.
For instance, advocates, consultants, or other organizations
that tell or advise others what to do need to balance their
main activities in an institutionally complex setting.
Research Methods
Research Design
We aim to extend theoretical insights into how advocates
are driven to practice what they tell others to do, since in
our cases we study sustainability advocates who drive self-
regulation of sustainable behavior of others. This is an area
that could be experienced as sensitive due to potential
scrutiny. Qualitative methods, like case studies, allow us to
come close to this potentially sensitive phenomenon
(Bansal and Corley 2011) and to uncover paradoxes (Doz
2011).
Our exploratory research is based on multiple case
studies (Yin 2009), in total consisting of a set of ten NGO
offices of three international advocacy organizations. These
ten NGO offices are the units of analysis. A sampling of
multiple cases enables cross-case comparison and adds
confidence to findings since its validity is strengthened
(Miles and Huberman 1994).
Purposive theoretical sampling in the selection of cases
is used to facilitate theoretical generalization (Eisenhardt
1989; Miles and Huberman 1994). Three criteria have been
used for case selection. The first criterion was the mission
type of the NGOs. Especially for advocacy NGOs that tend
to act as pressure groups in certain areas (Handy 1990),
such as environment or human rights, it becomes inter-
esting to explore those aspects in their own internal
operations.
The second criterion was related to organizational
issues. Selected NGOs are membership-based, have an
international working area and an organizational setup with
country organizations so that a similar complexity in
governance, operations, and reporting issues is in place.
The third selection criterion considered size and
resources. Organizations with a global annual income of at
least 200 million Euros were selected. Firm size matters
when it comes to sustainability-related behaviors (Gallo
and Christensen 2011), and the conduct of larger
organizations with a substantial income might get more
attention from its own stakeholders and more severe
requests for accountability (Anheier and Themudo 2005).
Next to that, bigger organizations should be able to spend
more on managing internal conduct and reporting.
These criteria have been used at two levels: first at the
NGO level and then at the country organization level. This
two-level procedure resulted in the selection of ten NGOs,
embedded in two major environmental NGOs (acronyms
ENV I and ENV II), and another major NGO focused on
human rights and the social dimension of sustainability
(acronym SOC). Although anonymity was not explicitly
requested by the NGOs, we use acronyms for the organi-
zations in order to focus on the data rather than on the
organizations themselves.
Table 1 provides an overview, per office, of some main
characteristics of the ten individual offices. In this paper,
we focus on the commonalities regarding drivers and bar-
riers to sustainable conduct in sustainability advocacy
NGOs.
Data Collection and Analysis Methods
Combined data collection methods are used in order to
enable triangulation and stronger building of variables and
propositions (Barratt et al. 2011; Eisenhardt 1989; Yin
2009). In order to enhance reliability of the case studies, a
protocol was developed before data collection took place
(Barratt et al. 2011; Eisenhardt 1989; Yin 2009). Minor
improvements in the protocol were made in-between
replications.
Interviews
Interviews conducted with individuals who were selected
as knowledgeable representatives of their offices in the area
of sustainable operations were the main source of infor-
mation for each case, in addition to organizational reports
and information from external sources. Table 2 presents
the data that was collected and the way in which these data
have been applied in our inductive analysis.
The interviews provided valuable information about
each office, including personal experiences, interpretations,
and views of interviewed individuals (see also Orr and
Scott 2008). The semi-structured interviews were based on
an interview protocol (this protocol and the interviewee list
can be obtained from the authors upon request). Interviews
were held at the international (head) offices (ENV I-INT,
ENV II-INT, SOC-INT), the Dutch national organizations
(ENV I-NL, ENV II-NL, SOC-NL), and the organizations
from the UK (ENV I-UK, ENV II-UK, SOC-UK). The
Dutch and UK national organizations were among the
major national fund-raising organizations for each of the
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three NGOs. Considering its added value for the research,
we also conducted an interview with the German office
(ENV I-GM). Interviews took place mainly by visiting
sites in the Netherlands and the UK, complemented with
phone interviews that had to take place outside those
countries.
Table 1 Main characteristics per organizational unit
Outlines of sustainability approach and practices
ENV I-INT
Located in the Netherlands; coordinates its international policy and strategy. Both staff and management support sustainable conduct within
the office. Sustainability criteria are an integral part of detailed procurement procedures. Several measures have been taken for making a
green office, ranging from strict travel policies to sustainable IT equipment. In terms of sustainability reporting, ENV I-INT coordinates
the international annual report, as well as part of the reporting to the INGO Accountability Charter
ENV I-UK
Has explicitly incorporated sustainability in its operations for years. A detailed CO2 accounting system has been developed internally in
order to measure impact and to introduce CO2 budgets, next to financial budgets. An environmental purchasing policy is in place (replaces
ENV I-UK’s sustainability policy that was spread over six different documents). An environmental report was published in 2009, 2010
ENV I-NL
Has been working on environmental operations. Policy includes, for instance, not to use PVC in buildings, to use environmentally conscious
building wood (FSC wood) and to buy food from sustainable vendors. An environmental policy for internal use was written around 2005.
Update started in 2009 to formalize and to extend its sustainability policy based on ISO 26000. There is a sustainability section in the 2010
annual report. Reporting directly to the INGO Accountability Charter
ENV I-GM
Recently developed a code of conduct and guidelines with, e.g., sustainability policies for travel and procurement. Sustainability was
already integrated in daily practice before; hence, central guidelines were not considered to be urgently needed. There is no sustainability
report or section yet, other than what is covered by ENV I-INT in the INGO Accountability Charter. Reporting is no priority and was
awaiting decisions around centralizing reporting to INGO Accountability Charter
ENV II-INT
Located in Switzerland, it coordinates network of offices around the world. At its own premises, building and operations have been greened.
In addition, they joined an initiative of their Finnish organization to green their office. In this program, energy, travel and transportation,
procurement, food, waste and recycling, water, biodiversity, energy, environmental awareness are being monitored. No external
sustainability report
ENV II-UK
Has been managing sustainability for its internal operations explicitly for two decades. They have an environmental team, a dedicated
environmental manager, an environmental policy and environmental management system (ISO 14001), and an environmental steering
group in place. Environmental reports have been published for over a decade
ENV II-NL
One of the biggest national organizations within ENV II that is able to raise funds and work quite independently. Office building is relatively
young and serves as a corporate sustainability flagship. A sustainability policy was developed in 2008, and projects are set up annually
based on this policy, e.g., involving procurement. The section on sustainability in the Dutch annual report is also based on the structure of
this policy and reports about those projects
SOC-INT
London based with about ten small satellite offices around the world (some with just 2 or 3 staff). A procurement policy is developed to
formalize procurement processes for the London office, yet no central sustainability policy or management drive for sustainable conduct is
found. Procurement and facilities management staff integrated sustainability aspects in their own work. In terms of reporting, there is the
contribution to the INGO Accountability Charter
SOC-UK
Has an office in London and 3 small satellite offices in the UK. In the London office, there is a drive both from management and from staff
and donors to work in a sustainable way. Management aims to be an exemplar office among other London NGO offices. The
environmental policy statement indicates selected areas for attention (including travel) and a procurement policy with a section on
sustainable procurement. The UK section published an annual report in 2010, including a sustainability section following GRI guidelines
and it contributes data to the INGO Accountability Charter
SOC-NL
A working group developed a sustainability policy for 2009–2010, as a first phase to update sustainability practices (policy evaluation and
revision in 2011). Work around sustainability internally driven by both management and staff by ‘practice what you preach’ awareness. In
their annual report and on the internet, sustainability reporting included in annual report. It contributes to the INGO Accountability
Charter
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Interviews per office included the persons responsible
for (sustainable) operations and (sustainability) reporting.
Functional backgrounds of these individuals varied per
organization, including facilities and/or purchasing man-
agers (8), financial managers (4), development or organi-
zational directors (4), an environmental manager, a legal
counsel, and an accountability manager. The 18 interviews
with 19 interviewees typically lasted 1 h, but varied from
30 min to 2 h.
Interviewing individuals from several functional areas
provides multiple approaches to the same subject and the
possibility for triangulation, or for enhancing reduction in
social desirability biases (Podsakoff et al. 2003). All
interviews were conducted by the first author. Interviews
mainly took place in person, with open-ended questions as
a starting point, not limiting the interviewee to raise new
aspects that could be relevant. All interviews were recor-
ded, transcribed with F4 software, coded, and analyzed
with the assistance of MAXQDA software.
Coding
Coding of transcripts was done independently by two
researchers in order to maximize reliability (Barratt et al.
2011; Eisenhardt 1989; Yin 2009). Various measures were
taken to maximize coding reliability. First, both coders set
up the research and worked closely together from the
beginning, developing a mutual understanding of its con-
text. Second, the list of codes was drafted in advance and
discussed in detail to facilitate and reach a shared inter-
pretation. In particular, the institutional factors needed
discussion because of their often tacit character. The
institutional categories were based on the institutional
pillars as outlined by Scott (2008, p. 51) and were outlined
for coding as follows: (a) Influences were coded as ‘reg-
ulative’ when they were explicit and connected to regula-
tive rules and conformation to legal requirements, laws,
governance systems; (b) ‘Normative’-coded fragments
refer to largely tacit social obligations which are connected
to binding expectations and norms, evaluation, conforming
to ideals and values, conventions, roles, taboos, practices,
protocols; (c) ‘Cultural-cognitive’ refers to highly tacit
constitutive schemes, beliefs, taken for grantedness, shared
understanding and is based on cognition, conforming to
models and related to mental models, identities, schemas,
beliefs, scripts.
The list of codes was enhanced during the analysis
(Miles and Huberman 1994), and hence, a combination has
been used from: (i) ex ante-listed codes primarily drawing
on institutional theory (such as normative, cultural-cogni-
tive, and regulative, drivers and barriers) and (ii) codes that
emerged from the raw data, for which an open possibility
was built in (see code structure in ‘‘Appendix 1’’).
A third measure to maximize coding reliability relates to
inter-coder differences. From the transcripts, all coding
differences were traced and addressed in detail by the
coders until a consensus was reached. This was done [i] by
adapting codes in fragments where one or both coders
reached a new perspective on the data, [ii] by adapting the
length of coded segments, or [iii] by assigning multiple
codes to some fragments, whichever was most appropriate.
The coding process continued until discussions about dif-
ferences in coding and interpretations of data were resolved
and a full consensus was reached.
Table 2 Data collection and analysis
Source Frequency Analysis
Archival data [30 annual reports, internal guidelines, other internal
publications (as available in 2011)
Screening for [1] organizational characteristics and data
and [2] data on sustainable conduct
Indicative for limited interest in external reporting
Interview data 18 semi-structured interviews, typically lasting 1 h but
ranging between 0.5 and 2 h (2011); 19 interviewees
Coding of data and clustering in themes:
Sustainability practices
Institutional influences (both drivers and barriers)
Organizational aspects
Secondary data analysis
through newspaper
articles
1145 articles with name of ENV I, ENV II or SOC1 n
title (2005–2010)
Screened and categorized as among others
Reported in advocacy role
Attacked on internal sustainability issues used as
indicator for public reporting about and perception of
NGOs
External sources on
NGO’s
Various sources Indicative of societal trust in NGOs like
Yearbook of International Organizations
Edelman Trust barometer
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After the coding, 2624 fragments were coded and agreed
by both coders. Within-case descriptions and abstracts
were made to analyze the main characteristics and to gain
insights per case. Related to the exploratory character of
the research, emerging patterns were identified to provide
insights into drivers and barriers for NGOs toward sus-
tainable internal conduct. Each researcher separately
combined codes and looked for patterns within and among
the ten offices. Major categories as a basis for analysis were
codes related as [1] drivers to practice, [2] barriers to
practice, [3] drivers to reporting, and [4] barriers to
reporting. These four categories were split into sub-cate-
gories according to institutional pillar and organizational
influence. Both coders separately analyzed the main find-
ings per sub-category. These analyses were combined and
contrasted in one analysis document.
In order to challenge and reevaluate patterns that were
found in the analysis document, the code relations browser
from MAXQDA was applied to the data. This browser did
not compare weights of coded fragments, but frequencies
of code relations indicate how often related elements are
brought forward. Frequencies varied substantially (see
some code relations tables in ‘‘Appendix 2’’) and supported
the researchers’ conclusions that regulative drivers hardly
play a role in sustainable conduct and that drivers for
reporting are weaker than drivers to behave in a sustainable
way. No conclusions were based solely on these
frequencies.
Strength of drivers was fully based on the (double-
coded) authors’ in-depth analysis of coded data per inter-
view. The MAXQDA code matrix (see ‘‘Appendix 2’’)
provided a very useful means for a quick check to see
whether data made sense. For this purpose, we reviewed
the frequencies of coded interview segments in the
MAXQDA code matrix browser. Still, we did not use this
matrix in quantitative terms, but rather in qualitative terms
to confirm the authors’ understanding of the data and its
content analysis. The fact that some institutional drivers
were more commonly mentioned as drivers of sustainable
conduct in the interviews was taken as reinforcing evidence
of the strength of the driver.
External Data Sources
Besides the data from the organizations themselves (in-
terviews and self-reported documents), external data
sources were also used to investigate public reports about
pressures from and to the organizations. Through a sec-
ondary data analysis in the Lexis-Nexis database, interna-
tional newspaper articles dating from 2005 to 2010 that
targeted ENV I, ENV II or SOC (in the title) were selected.
All 1145 articles were screened and categorized as [1]
NGO is reported in an advocacy role; [2] NGO is being
questioned or being attacked on its social conduct (envi-
ronmental or social aspects); [3] NGO is being questioned
or being attacked on other conduct; or [4] other (NGO
neither as advocate, nor being attacked or questioned).
These categorized data provide an indicator about the
public perception of and reporting about the NGOs in our
research.
Tabulation of Data
Figure 1 shows the connection between raw data and
related core concepts that resulted from the data analyses.
The internal and external legitimacy-seeking influences
mainly had a driving character, whereas internal trade-offs
compromised the principles for sustainable internal con-
duct. In addition, immunity indicated that NGOs in general
had hardly any scrutiny of their sustainable conduct.
The organizational facts in the papers were validated
with the NGOs, and no amendments or corrections were
proposed by their contact persons.
Results
In this section, we develop an exploratory analysis across
the ten cases, focused on our research question: What are
the drivers and barriers to sustainable conduct of NGOs
that are sustainability advocates?
Sustainable internal conduct varies considerably across
the ten organizational units included in our research.
Remarkable differences are found internally among the
sustainability approaches of different offices, and even
among offices of the same NGO. Each office operates quite
independently, generally without strict central guidelines or
imperatives, as shown in methods section in Table 1.
Table 3 summarizes the presence of a sustainability
policy and an authors’ analysis of the character and per-
ceived strength of the institutional drivers toward sustain-
able conduct.
As an example of how the drivers given in Table 3 are
categorized, we briefly illustrate the motivation of ENV
I-UK. In this particular case, we categorized institutional
influences as (i) nonexistent/unreported regulative drive;
(ii) a major cultural-cognitive drive; and (iii) a medium
normative drive. First, in general, regulative drivers were
insignificant (please refer to ‘‘Appendix 2’’), but in the
specific case of ENV I-UK, this type of driver was not
encountered or reported at all. Second, in relation to the
cultural-cognitive drive, ENV I-UK reflected first of all
both management and staff involvement, and next to that a
strong intrinsic motivation and taken-for-granted position:
Our interviewees indicated and also illustrated that their
staff are ‘committed and passionate’ about sustainability.
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Finally, the normative drive was also encountered,
although less prominently. Firstly, it was, for instance,
reflected by the fact that funders’ expectations on how to
spend money were acknowledged and taken into account,
and secondly by a small review of sustainable internal
conduct, which the organization made available publicly. A
third sign of a normative drive was the struggle around
which norms apply to judge what products could be con-
sidered ‘sustainable’ (like the Carbon Trust that rates
‘kettles’).
Although organizational practices differed among the
ten advocacy NGOs, our cross-case analyses revealed
commonalities in the underlying complexity. On the one
hand, regulative drivers were insignificant, while both
cultural-cognitive and normative drivers were encountered
and manifested mainly in a taken-for-granted attitude from
the staff and an awareness of others’ expectations. On the
other hand, trade-offs between advocacy work and work on
sustainable internal conduct were also found.
These findings derived from three core concepts
emerging from the raw data (see Fig. 1). First, a legiti-
macy-seeking stance—both internally and externally—
related to the three institutional pillars (cultural-cognitive,
normative, and regulative); second, trade-offs faced by
NGOs; and finally, the organizations’ immunity. These
concepts are further explained next.
Cultural-Cognitive Drivers
The cultural-cognitive pillar was a determining factor and
driver for the advocacy NGO offices’ internal sustainability
of operations. The sense of ‘taken for granted’ (‘of course
we strive to work in a sustainable way’) was commonly
mentioned in the interviews as an important driver for
management and employees to behave in a sustainable
way. The cultural-cognitive drivers included the shared
motivation of the organization’s employees to behave in a
sustainable way as ‘the way we do these things,’ which is
demonstrated in the example of ENV II-UK:
Some mornings… our boilers are so inefficient… you
know… the temperature is about 16 degrees… and
we have to wait for it to gradually warm up… Even
though boilers come on you know mid-night to
Intrinsic drive: 
internally taken 
for granted
Perceived 
vulnerability: 
walk-the-talk need
Output legitimacy: 
advocacy work
Output legitimacy: 
(financial) 
accountability
Legitimacy 
seeking
Internal 
trade-offs
Externally taken 
for granted
Immunity
FIRST ORDER CLASSIFIED DATA
SECOND ORDER 
THEMES
Lack of scrutiny• SOC_INT:“there is no one telling us that we need to improve... we need to say 
that to ourselves”.
• Archival data analysis
• ENV II_NL:“We think that people see us as a good example”
• ENV I_GM:“…the public assumes that you are clean and that you are 
complying”
• SOC_UK: “people give us money for human rights... and they don't really 
want too many diverts away from that... although equally our members want to 
see that we are environmentally sustainable....”
• ENV I_INT: the NGO cannot justify “having a completely beautiful single 
dancing green lovely office, when all of our supporters' money has gone to 
doing that, as opposed to campaigning, so it is a very real trade-off...”
• ENV II_INT: flights are still necessary to do the advocacy work: “flights is the 
biggest CO2 emissions that we do have and it is a problem, but we are a global 
organization and we need to travel and meet people and see projects and plan 
the future”
• ENV I_NL: “if we do an action and for the action it is needed to hire 10 or 20 
cars, we hire 10 or 20 cars...”
• ENV I_GM: “We are pretty much on the extreme end of trying to be very 
pure, independent and that also probably makes it different, makes us 
potentially very fragile, so we need to focus a lot on walk the talk and on being 
environmentally correct, just in case anybody asks.”
• ENV I_UK: “people who work for these organizations are committed and 
passionate, so there is already a level of motivation that may be higher.”
• SOC_UK: “our employees are very keen, very keen, and you would expect 
that because of the field they work in... this is just kind of the nature of the 
person they are... so they are very keen...”
CORE 
CONCEPTS
Fig. 1 Connection between raw data and core concepts
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start… and yet we hardly have any complaints
because people know that the alternative is to buy
new boilers or to have the boilers on 24 h a day and
they know that’s not sustainable.
A personal will and intrinsic drive played a key role in
decisions concerning sustainability, indicating a search for
internal legitimacy. For example, ENV I-UK indicated
that ‘people who work for these organizations are
committed and passionate, so there is already a level of
motivation that may be higher.’ SOC-UK indicated that
‘our employees are very keen, very keen, and you would
expect that because of the field they work in… this is just
kind of the nature of the person they are… so they are very
keen…’.
The ‘taken-for-granted’ approach appeared to be
somehow skewed toward the organizational mission.
Although all organizations acknowledged social and envi-
ronmental aspects as part of sustainability, there was
evidence that sustainability aspects that were closely rela-
ted to their organizational mission were prioritized. An
explicit awareness of this focus was mentioned in five
cases. For instance, SOC-UK mentioned: ‘…purchasing
decisions are skewed. We do skew heavily on the labor
standards… other organizations might skew towards
environmental standards, depending on where they are.’
In addition, the way in which practices started to
develop was mentioned in some cases, pointing to a natural
development where sustainable practices spontaneously
evolved and were naturally supported by management.
These processes confirm the taken-for-granted feeling, as
illustrated by ENV I-NL: ‘it was not really defined as a
policy… it was a way of working, which was really into the
minds and hearts of everybody.’
Almost all organizations gave evidence that they looked
at other NGOs’ internal conduct to learn from it or to
benchmark their own behavior. Seven organizations
Table 3 Drivers to sustainable conduct per organizational unit (indicative)
NGOs Cultural 
Cognitive
Normative Regulative Sustainability 
policya
ENV I-INT Yes
ENV I-NL Yes
ENV I-UK Yes
ENV I-GM Yes
ENV II-INT Yes
ENV II-NL Yes
ENV II-UK Yes
SOC – INT No
SOC – NL Yes
SOC - UK Yes
= non-existent / not reported, = weak drive, = medium drive, = major drive
a
 A sustainability policy is in place when the organization has written guidelines or a policy that explicitly 
covers sustainability aspects at least.
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evidenced an even more active exchange of practices with
local peers or other NGOs. As noted by SOC-UK, ‘my
peers… all the facilities managers who are running
buildings, we are quite often going into each other’s
buildings just to have a look at what they are doing (…)
and we want to show off our building too.’ SOC-UK also
highlighted that ‘… it’s interesting and it’s good to be able
to share… share knowledge, but there is quite a lot of pride
in that as well…’. Contacts with local peers to exchange
sustainability practices in general outweighed contacts and
benchmarks with other offices within their own NGO.
Finally, all organizations had in common the fact that
when it came to reporting on sustainability—as part of their
sustainable conduct—, cultural-cognitive elements did not
seem to play a role. None of the units provided evidence
that sustainability reporting was something taken for
granted that naturally needed to happen, whereas such
cultural-cognitive drivers were generally in place for sus-
tainable behavior in varying strengths across the organi-
zational units.
Normative Drivers
Next to cultural-cognitive elements, normative drivers
played an important role for the analyzed offices. There
were expectations and values set by others for the organi-
zation, which were a sort of social obligation. It was as if
these advocacy NGOs were looking for external legiti-
macy. In two cases, organizations proactively asked
stakeholders for their opinion, and members’ expectations
were frequently mentioned, such as in this example by
SOC-UK:
People give us money for human rights… and they
don’t really want too many diverts away from that…
although equally our members want to see that we are
environmentally sustainable and although we are not
actively damaging the environment I think they
would be upset if they heard that we are doing stuff
that was damaging to the environment….
There was a sense of perceived vulnerability as they felt
they needed to ‘walk the talk’. The NGO’s own mission
played a key role in relation to external stakeholders’
expectations about its sustainable conduct. For the outside
world, the organization’s mission would be reflected
implicitly by the organization’s internal behavior. This
would reveal its mission as an expectation toward the NGO
itself. All organizations mentioned this need to practice
what they told others to do, since not doing so was related
to potential reputational damage, as stated by ENV I-Germ:
ENV I is the leading environmental organization, so
the pressure so to speak on walk the talk might be
higher than on the Doctors Without Frontiers… We
are pretty much on the extreme end of trying to be
very pure, independent and that also probably makes
it different, makes us potentially very fragile, so we
need to focus a lot on walk the talk and on being
environmentally correct, just in case anybody asks.
We cannot afford anything like that to happen to
make the headlines of the news. So that makes us
probably different from other NGOs.
In needing to ‘walk the talk,’ some advocacy campaigns
even caused an internal ‘wake-up call’. This is what makes
advocacy NGOs so unique compared to firms and even
other NGOs. Sometimes the campaigns themselves insti-
gate internal changes without any explicit external request.
For instance, ENV I-Germ used a campaign against a
company using a coal power plant as a trigger for their own
conduct, even though the power consumption of an NGO
office was modest in absolute terms.
Furthermore, there were sustainability standards that the
offices selected to comply with. Those standards set criteria
and consequently drove internal conduct. Some organiza-
tions chose standards (norms) with which to comply as a
guideline, while some developed their own way of work-
ing. Three types of external standards were found: [1] at a
product level in all organizations, standards and labels were
found for the use of, for instance, FSC-certified paper,
MSC fish, or Fair Trade products; [2] at an organizational
level in only one case, international certifiable management
standards like ISO 14001 (environmental management)
were found, whereas one other organization (ENV I-NL)
started to use ISO 26000, which are guidelines for social
responsibility; and [3] reporting standards on either the
international or national level.
Regarding the other element of sustainable conduct,
drivers to sustainability reporting were in place to a lesser
extent than drivers to sustainable practices. Still, the ‘walk-
the-talk’ pressure was being mentioned by the intervie-
wees, since NGOs ask businesses to be transparent about
their operations.
Regulative Drivers
Examples of the regulative pillar were rarely found in the
interviews. In general, regulations did not seem to play a
significant role in any of the organizational units.
Institutional Barriers
When it came to institutional influences that withheld
NGOs from sustainable behavior, all interviewed organi-
zations mentioned compromises or trade-offs because of
competing activities such as the NGOs’ main advocacy
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work. Rather than encountering resistance against sus-
tainable conduct, it was the setting of priorities that in some
cases slowed down efforts to enhance sustainability in
internal operations.
First, cultural-cognitive influences were an important
driver to sustainable practices in general, but at the same
time they were seen as limiters of further sustainable
conduct. Hence, although interviewees indicated that
employees in their organization were disciplined and
motivated to behave in a sustainable way, some exceptions
were mentioned where it was challenging for the organi-
zations to motivate staff. The cultural-cognitive drive
varied per organization, but the exceptions to a sustainable
conduct driven by cultural-cognitive reasons were gener-
ally those cases where convenience, efficiency, or existing
ways of working on advocacy work would be compromised
if more sustainable practices had to be adopted. For
instance, ENV II-INT indicated that flights were still nec-
essary to do their advocacy work: ‘flights is the biggest
CO2 emissions that we do have and it is a problem, but we
are a global organization and we need to travel and meet
people and see projects and plan the future. ’
Some limitations to sustainable conduct within an
organization resulted from scarcity of resources and (fi-
nancial) accountability for expenses. Trade-offs needed to
be made, as mentioned by SOC-UK: ‘obviously, we can
spend our resources on a Middle East campaign for human
rights or measuring carbon emissions from our business
travel and you know… that’s a real… that’s a real
choice…’. In many reported trade-offs, supporters’
expectations were mentioned. ENV I-INT indicated that
they could not justify ‘having a completely beautiful single
dancing green lovely office, when all of our supporters’
money has gone to doing that, as opposed to campaigning,
so it is a very real trade-off…’.
Second, normative influences, which have been reported
as important drivers, also had a decelerator role. In fact,
norms and expectations of external stakeholders had a
distinct influence on the trade-off between internal sus-
tainability conduct and advocacy work. For instance, some
organizations felt the pressure from donors in the use of
money (for example, ‘our supporters want us to use the
best products but they also don’t want us to spend too much
money on them (…) so we have use that wisely as well…,’
GP UK). The concern about making the best use of the
supporters’ money was present in some interviews, refer-
ring to the need to balance advocacy work with their own
sustainable conduct that often requires some upfront
investment (such as efficient facilities and heating systems
or water and energy savers). At the same time, being
organizations with sustainability-related missions and
working on the ‘good cause,’ NGOs seemed to have natural
legitimacy. Stakeholders considered it logical that NGOs
behaved in a sustainable way and thus did not scrutinize
them on those aspects. As stated by ENV II-NL, ‘We think
that people see us as a good example’; similarly, SOC-INT
stated: ‘there is no one telling us that we need to improve…
we need to say that to ourselves.’ The quite explicit
example in this respect, quoted in the first lines of this
paper, comes from ENV I-GM, which wanted to be certi-
fied with ISO 14000, but was advised to spend their money
otherwise because they were trusted anyway.
It is important to note that none of the NGOs proved to
be seriously questioned by external stakeholders about
their sustainable conduct, and this may have reduced the
need to emphasize internal sustainability. This lack of
scrutiny was confirmed by the findings from our secondary
data search. Out of the 1145 articles published between
2005 and 2010, only about 60 referred to some sort of
criticism toward the NGOs, and they hardly specifically
referred to the NGOs’ own sustainable conduct. Rather,
they referred mostly to criticism regarding the way these
organizations developed their mission, such as their orga-
nizational approach to the issues addressed and their dis-
regard to law when campaigning (mostly ENV I), disregard
of national legal and social context (mostly SOC), or
issuing of misleading information (all three NGOs).
There were a few examples specifically related to sus-
tainability, such as the ones in 2005 featuring ENV I,
involving a ship that hit a coral reef in the Philippines, and
a polemic prize (trips to ‘paradise’ destinations) created by
the USA office for those recruiting new members or
campaigning against nuclear power. This prize was criti-
cized by other offices, reinforcing the different approaches
of offices around the world. In three other articles, some
reference was made to the potential indirect social impacts
to the local communities caused by the NGOs’ campaigns,
such as loss of jobs.
Finally, the regulative institutional factors slowing down
sustainable practices, just like those driving them, are
anecdotal. Only in one case it was mentioned that there
were fiscal benefits, where VAT advantages boosted
printing magazines instead of sending them by e-mail or
making it smaller.
Discussion
Advocacy NGOs are important players that drive other
organizations to behave in a sustainable way. This research
aims to understand what drives or withholds NGOs to
operate in a sustainable way internally and how institu-
tional theory and institutional complexity could explain
these drivers or barriers.
For other organizations, a positive relationship has been
found between sustainability aspects mentioned in firms’
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mission statements and internal practices, such as work–
life initiatives (Blair-Loy et al. 2011) or stakeholder man-
agement (Bartkus and Glassman 2008). For advocacy
NGOs, it can be argued that this relationship between
advocacy mission and internal conduct could be even
stronger. Our findings disentangle, from an institutional
point of view, drivers and barriers to sustainable conduct of
NGOs acting as sustainability advocates.
Internal Legitimacy: Taken for Grantedness
A significant internal taken-for-granted motivation was
found in the majority of cases, driving sustainable behavior
because of its self-evidence for the employees. The wish to
behave—in line with the mission—in a sustainable way
was indicated to be something natural for most organiza-
tions, albeit often biased toward the own mission area (for
instance, missions for environment or social conditions or
human rights). Yet, there was broad recognition that sus-
tainability outside the mission area was also important.
Those ‘natural drivers’ have cultural-cognitive character-
istics (Scott 2008) that drive the NGO’s sustainable con-
duct, encompassing moral motives for sustainable
behavior. Contrary to this, previous research shows that for
firms, among a broad variety of drivers for sustainable
conduct (Aguinis and Glavas 2012; Bansal 2005), the
business case of sustainable behavior and maximizing
profits often play a major role (Ambec and Lanoie 2008;
Campbell 2007; Hopkins et al. 2011; Kiron et al. 2012).
Additionally, for organizations that do not have a sustain-
ability-related mission, cultural-cognitive drivers appear to
be lower in general (see also Hoejmose and Adrien-Kirby
2012; Walker et al. 2008). In contrast, the NGO repre-
sentatives in this research indicated, as a key motive, that
sustainable behavior was something natural for their
organizations which had missions beyond profit maxi-
mization. As noted earlier, this intrinsic drive played a key
role in decisions concerning sustainability, suggesting a
search for internal legitimacy. Based on our findings, the
extent to which the sustainability-related mission and
advocacy work of NGOs that act in sustainability enhance
internal ‘taken for grantedness’ related to the need to
internally behave in a sustainable way deserves further
exploration.
External Legitimacy: Perceived Vulnerability
and Immunity
Next to the cultural-cognitive influences, versatile norma-
tive influences were encountered coming from the mission,
characterized by a distinct interplay of influences which
were specific for those advocacy NGOs (expectations,
external values of members, for instance). Two important
contrasting influences determine the effect of the normative
pillar in the search for external legitimacy, which urges the
organizations to comply with expectations and norms of
stakeholders who act outside the organization. These are
what we name here as ‘perceived vulnerability’ and
‘immunity’.
Related to the ‘perceived vulnerability,’ all NGO offices
perceived that their sustainability-related work and mission
increased expectations from others regarding their own
conduct. Thus, there were specific norms with which to
comply because of their sustainability-related mission. As
it was often mentioned, they needed to ‘walk the talk’.
However, the organizations indicated that they had not
really been questioned or challenged on internal sustain-
able behavior on a large scale, as confirmed by our docu-
ment analysis of international newspapers. Considering this
lack of active scrutiny, the ‘need-to-walk-the-talk-percep-
tion’ points to a sense of exposure to potential scrutiny,
which we introduce as the perceived vulnerability of the
organization’s legitimacy.
From an institutional perspective, this perceived vul-
nerability tends to be a normative influence (Scott 2008),
since the NGOs own advocacy work and norms they apply
to others are now perceived as norms that others might
apply to the advocacy NGO itself. This perception drives
sustainability higher up the NGOs’ agenda. Hence, the
norms NGOs apply to others seem to have a boomerang
function. A clear representation of this boomerang effect
comes from campaign work, which in some cases directly
urged the NGOs to look at their own conduct. In the case of
ENV I, it attacked a global internet service provider with
regard to the provider’s energy sources, and this created an
internal mandate for renewable energy sources. The orga-
nization first created their advocacy campaign for other
organizations and then reacted to their own campaign as an
internal wake-up call.
Our findings suggest that the sustainability-related mis-
sion and advocacy work sharpens notions of perceived
vulnerability. For advocacy NGOs in the area of sustain-
ability, we find that perceived vulnerability and their
legitimacy-seeking approach in turn relate directly to the
organization’s intentions to behave in a sustainable way
themselves. Further research could explore the extent to
which the advocate’s perceived vulnerability influences the
drive to conform to the mission internally.
Besides the perceived vulnerability, the second norma-
tive influence related to NGOs’ mission was ‘immunity’.
The NGOs’ mission-related legitimacy reduces external
scrutiny and direct pressures on sustainable internal con-
duct. By being not-for-profit-oriented, with socially and/or
environmentally oriented missions, legitimacy might
automatically be perceived to be guaranteed for NGOs. It is
externally taken for granted that those NGOs behave in a
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sustainable way. This legitimacy related to sustainability
also reduces the organization’s need to report about inter-
nal sustainability, so that resources can be used for other
purposes (Jepson 2005).
In general, legitimacy is a potentially important driving
force and guidance for business conduct in organizations
(Singh et al. 1986). In this specific case, however, legiti-
macy also provides immunity by reducing the need to pay
attention to sustainable internal conduct. This immunity is
based on this external taken for grantedness (external
legitimacy) and a lack of scrutiny (as also appeared in our
secondary data search). Thus, in contrast to the earlier
discussion on the potential effects of having a sustainable-
related mission and facing perceived vulnerability, this
discussion points toward a potential negative influence of
the NGOs’ sustainability-related mission on its sustainable
internal conduct through immunity.
In fact, this lack of external scrutiny suggests that these
NGOs are hardly held accountable for sustainable internal
conduct. The role accountability plays in the ethical deci-
sion making has been explored in the literature (e.g., Beu
et al. 2003; Frink and Klimoski 1998). In their study, Beu
et al. (2003, p. 91) concluded that, despite what literature
suggested, those who were not held accountable at all did
not necessarily engage in the most unethical behavior. This
touches our discussion on immunity of NGOs in the sense
that the immunity felt by these organizations may alleviate
their drive to engage in more ethical behavior, which in this
case is the sustainable internal conduct. This does not mean
that they would behave unethically, rather that it may
influence the trade-offs discussed in this paper.
As such—and paradoxically enough—the mission seems
to have two opposing effects. On the one hand, NGOs per-
ceive that behaving in a sustainable way is implicitly
expected by others implicitly and that not doing so brings a
real (reputational) risk. Thus, they need to practice what they
tell others to do (‘walk the talk’). The notions of sustainable-
related mission and perceived vulnerability bring forward
institutional forces that place sustainable internal conduct
higher on the NGOs’ agenda. On the other hand, that same
mission brings legitimacy, which actually seems to prevent
NGOs from being scrutinized. Thus, it is mainly the NGOs
themselves who feel the need to comply to expectations,
rather than stakeholders explicitly asking them to do so. This
first effect of ‘walking the talk’ stimulates awareness
regarding the sustainability of internal conduct, whereas the
second effect of immunity may influence the trade-off
between the direct advocacy work and the internal operations
in favor of advocacy work.
In order to address this paradoxical influence of an
NGO’s mission, we went back to the data and contrasted
the ‘we-need-to-walk-the-talk’ effects in fragments coded
as drivers with the ‘legitimacy’ effects in fragments coded
as (normative) barriers to practice, where the NGO’s mis-
sion enhanced legitimacy and thus immunity. We found the
strongest explicit evidence for the first effect. Although not
(yet) scrutinized, the NGOs want to have ‘their house in
order’. The driving effect of ‘walking the talk’ seems to
prevail over potential effects of immunity and the lack of
external scrutiny.
Institutional Complexity: Trade-Offs
Despite the importance of sustainable internal conduct, the
NGOs’ advocacy activities compete for the same scarce
internal resources. This forces NGOs to make trade-offs
concerning resources like money and time. Following Le
Menestrel and de Bettignies (2002), trade-offs between
processes and consequences characterize business ethical
dilemmas. The distinctive challenge for the researched
NGOs is that in their case the dilemmas are not between
economic interests (consequences) and ethical values of
business actors (processes) (Le Menestrel and de Bettignies
2002); rather, it is between ‘walking the talk’ themselves
(processes) and accomplishing their advocacy mission
(consequences).
Two factors should be taken into account for this trade-
off. The first factor is what Ossewaarde et al. (2008, p. 45)
referred to as ‘output legitimacy,’ defined as the need ‘to
show how they actually materialize their objectives.’ In
other words, NGOs need to be able to show the realization
of their missions toward stakeholders. Spending time and
money on advocacy work might often realize more influ-
ential changes than spending those resources on managing
internal sustainability. As relatively small organizations,
NGOs’ internal operations have only a modest sustain-
ability impact (Unerman and O’Dwyer 2006b), whereas
their core advocacy work is often mentioned as a core
influential driver for others (e.g., Domeisen and Hulm
2006; Haack et al. 2012; Kong et al. 2002; Valente 2012;
Van Cranenburgh et al. 2013). This implies that spending
time on internal operations would be less efficient in terms
of sustainability than spending time on advocacy work and
therefore might be more difficult to justify to stakeholders
like sponsors (Ossewaarde et al. 2008).
A second factor for NGOs output legitimacy is their
financial accountability (Jepson 2005; Steffek and Hahn
2010). NGOs need to be transparent about the way dona-
tions are spent. Internal conduct will not be classified as
advocacy work and hence should utilize limited resources.
Enlightened by institutional theory, the ethical dilemmas
(O’Fallon and Butterfield 2005) and conflicting institu-
tional demands encountered in this study point at the notion
of institutional complexity (Greenwood et al. 2011).
The NGOs’ mission and primary raison d’eˆtre are
located in their direct advocacy work. We find that their
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mission also drives sustainability of their internal conduct,
referring to a kind of role-model function in which they
practice what they tell others to do: behave in a sustainable
way. This resembles the link made by Fassin (2009, p. 515)
between raison d’eˆtre and the ‘intrinsically ethical grounds
that underpin their (NGOs) foundations.’
The role-model function embodies institutional com-
plexity (Greenwood et al. 2011): conflicting institutional
demands inform the organizations regarding how to bal-
ance ends (advocacy vs. symbolic function of role model)
when means like time and money are scarce (cf. Pache and
Santos 2010). The conflicting demands rise between
notions of perceived vulnerability and intrinsic drive (for
role model) on the one hand, and upward accountability
and output responsibility for advocacy work on the other.
The need for NGOs to undertake balancing acts is also
mentioned by Fassin (2009) in his work on the ethical
evaluation of actions taken by NGOs toward ‘victim’
corporations. The dilemma for those organizations was
how to formalize and institutionalize transparency and
accountability practices, without losing the essence of their
raison d’eˆtre. This notion of raison d’eˆtre used by (Fassin
2009) resembles the ‘walk-the-talk’ concept used in this
paper, as a NGO’s raison d’eˆtre should be reflected in the
way they act.
Despite the perceived vulnerability, we did not
encounter actual cases of external scrutiny. This is in line
with the notion that visible organizations may be insulated
from (external) organizational pressures (Greenwood et al.
2011; Kraatz and Block 2008). Paradoxically enough, the
same type of organizations might be especially targeted by
stakeholders, underlining the fragility of their legitimacy
(Greenwood et al. 2011).
Conclusions
Our research question addresses the following question:
‘What are the drivers and barriers to sustainable conduct
of NGOs that are sustainability advocates?’ Even if these
findings can somehow be considered as intuitive when it
comes to drivers and barriers per se, our research raises two
important aspects to the literature: the notion of trade-offs
and of immunity of advocate NGOs, who could be
expected to walk their talk, in the context of their sus-
tainability practices.
Our contribution to literature is threefold. First, we study
drivers and barriers to sustainable conduct in a novel
context, and understudied organizations like advocacy
NGOs may reveal novel approaches and insights (cf. Pagell
and Shevchenko 2014). We refine and extend knowledge
about what may drive or refrain an organization’s sus-
tainable conduct from an institutional point of view. There
is a novel and significant position for cultural-cognitive
drivers (see Campbell 2007), as well as for the major
paradoxical effect of the NGOs’ mission, which stimulates
sustainable behavior through ‘perceived vulnerability’ on
the one hand, and on the other hand potentially reduces the
need to internally behave in a sustainable way through
‘immunity.’ Although part of these results might be
idiosyncratic for advocacy NGOs, similar drivers and
paradoxical effects might be found in organizations in
areas such as fair trade, ethical banking, or political orga-
nizations with a sustainability focus. For organizations that
do not have a sustainability-related mission, cultural-cog-
nitive drivers appear to be lower in general (see also
Hoejmose and Adrien-Kirby 2012; Walker et al. 2008), and
there is no role-model function at stake in their trade-offs
between their mission and sustainable internal conduct.
Second, the advocacy-related mission and work seem to
have a paradoxical effect on internal conduct. On the one
hand they are driving force, yet on the other hand their
legitimacy may enable trade-offs in favor of primary
advocacy work. This is understandable, given a NGO’s
advocacy role; however, the public-at-large may actually
expect NGOs to also ‘walk the talk’ internally. These
trade-offs represent ethical dilemmas faced by managers in
these NGOs between processes (ethical internal operations)
and consequences (advocacy mission accomplishment).
We outline conflicting demands that NGOs face between
advocacy work and a symbolic function as (internal and
external) role model. We find that organizations respond to
those demands in heterogeneous ways, even within the
same NGO.
Third, while exploring these themes, this study extends
the extant knowledge base on NGOs, which are organiza-
tions with missions beyond profit maximization. Our case
findings show that their advocacy mission has both nor-
mative (perceived need to ‘walk the talk’), cultural-cog-
nitive (taken for granted), and legitimating effects on the
NGOs’ internal conduct.
This study had some limitations, such as the fact that it
involved a limited number of advocacy NGOs and a lim-
ited geographical scope. Furthermore, the study focuses on
institutional influences rather than organizational drivers
and barriers to sustainable conduct. Future research could
further explore the factors identified in this study, including
the influence of a sustainable-related mission, perceived
vulnerability, and immunity. In addition, organizational
characteristics were found to potentially be among the
important barriers in the adoption of sustainable conduct
(next to institutional drivers and barriers), like organiza-
tional size, rented or old office buildings, a limited number
of employees, and the internal global governance model
(see also Bowen et al. 2001; Gallo and Christensen 2011;
Min and Galle 2001). Future research could incorporate
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these characteristics. Another direction for future research
would be a further analysis of organizations’ position
toward their role-model function in relation to organiza-
tions’ identity (Greenwood et al. 2011; Kodeih and
Greenwood 2013).
Finally, our research touches on a hidden form of
institutional complexity: the way to cope with a symbolic
role-model function. Advocates, consultants, or other
organizations that tell (or advise) others what to do need to
balance their main activities with this role-model function.
A direct managerial implication of this study for those
organizations is to appreciate that internal conduct has
symbolic value and is more than just the infrastructure for
fulfilling its mission. For the NGOs in this study, this
would imply that organizational members should reflect on
the position of their sustainable internal conduct and the
rationale behind its current decentralized approach. A more
centralized policy could set out principles for internal
conduct across the organization.
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Appendix 1: Coding Structure
Initial codes
Subject Codes Remarks
Three institutional
pillars as described by
Scott (2008), where
those pillars are
outlined cognitive
1. Regulative
2. Normative
3. Cultural
Both before coding and
during the coding
process, coders made
sense of the meaning
of the three pillars.
The regulative pillar,
with as basis of order
‘regulative rules’ and
basis of legitimacy
‘legal sanctions’ was
clearest. Regulative
influences, however,
turned out to be
minimal for NGOs
internal conduct. The
normative and
cultural-cognitive
were discussed more
often (see research
methods)
Initial codes
Subject Codes Remarks
Character of the
influence on internal
sustainability; drivers
or barriers
4. Driver to practice
5. Driver to report
6. Barrier to practice
7. Barrier to report
Driver: positive, driving
influence
Barrier: negative,
slowing (or even
blocking) influence
Distinction made in
driver/barrier coding
between practice and
reporting as additional
refinement.
Accountability and
transparency are
integral part of
sustainable conduct,
and in the final
version/analysis, both
sustainable practices
and reporting are
clustered as
sustainable conduct.
We used the
refinement in the
results and the
discussion section
where we mentioned
reporting explicitly as
nuances
Examples and outlines
of sustainability
practices
8. Practices
9. Reporting
10. Policies
Practices: descriptions
of sustainable conduct
as practiced in the
organization
Reporting: descriptions
of sustainability
reporting as practiced
in the organization
Policies: sections that
referred to documents,
rules, or guidelines
that were guiding
sustainable conduct
Organizational factors Size, resources,
knowledge/skills,
governance issues,
stage of development,
mission
Next to institutional,
legitimacy-related
influences, also
practical factors
turned out to be
influential factors. The
size of the
organization state of
buildings, etc. owned
or rented, specialist
knowledge that was
available due to
advocacy work, and
interactions between
offices of the same
NGO. We included
those in our coding
Governance The way the
organization is
governed (formal and
informal)
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Appendix 2: Code Relations Matrix
Example of two excerpts of the code relation browser.
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